The Richmond Journal
of Law and The Public Interest
Fall 1996 - vol. II no. 1
Abstract
The U.S. Presidency: Fostering Global Free Trade Through Minilateral Free Trade
Agreements with Germany and Japan argues that global free trade will be better served
by agreements of substance among fewer countries than by agreements of form among many
countries. Specifically, the article addresses problems with the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and argues that the goal of global free trade is more easily
achieved through bilateral agreements between the United States and Germany, and the
United States and Japan. The article concludes that such bilateral agreements, and the
ultimate goal of global free trade, can be realized only through the strength and power of
the United States President.
J.R. Smith is a third-year student
at the University of Richmond School of Law. He received a B.A. in Journalism and East
Asian Studies from Washington and Lee University. He spent three years teaching English in
Japan. He will receive a J.D. in May 1997.